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Political connections are valuable for shareholders of privately-run firms especially in 
countries with weak legal institutions. We study the effect of a firm’s political connections in 
the public equity market by focusing on its impact on the firms’ dividend policy.  Prior 
studies suggest that dividends signal the commitment for proper treatment of minority 
shareholders and thus high growth firms pay dividends to establish such a reputation for 
better access to equity market in the future. Using a sample of privately-owned Chinese firms, 
we find that politically connected firms are less likely to pay dividends and pay less if they 
pay. Investors value firms’ political connections more than dividends, and they are more 
likely to endorse managerial decisions in politically connected firms. Specifically, investors 
of these firms have a significantly lower valuation of dividend payouts than otherwise similar 
firms but without connections. They prefer firm investments to cash payouts by connected 
firms with high growth opportunities, and tend to value these firms’ investment decisions 
significantly higher. Finally, connected firms are also more able to tap public equity market 
for funds. Our study sheds light on the effect of political connections on firm policies.    
Keywords: Political connections, dividend policy 






There is a burgeoning literature showing that political connections are valuable for firms (e.g., 
Roberts, 1990; Fisman, 2001; Ramalho, 2007). It is especially so in emerging countries with 
weak legal institutions, where there is lack of spirit of contract and the incompleteness of 
contract is more of a severe problem. Relationship and network, instead, dominate in business 
environment. Specifically, firms with political connections can obtain special access to 
business opportunities and cheap capital, and get more favourable regulatory treatment in 
scenarios such as industry entry, capital market discipline and government bailout.1 Yet, there 
are also costs to shareholders in politically connected firms such as the inferior quality of 
accounting information (Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 2011) and the potential of 
expropriation (Qian, Pan, and Yeung, 2011). 
In light of its benefits and costs, what is the implication of a firm’s political connection to 
investors in the public equity market? Whether and how do investors value a firm’s political 
connections? Are they more or less likely to endorse managerial decisions in connected firms? 
This paper attempts to answer these questions empirically. And we do this in the context of 
how a firm’s political connections may affect its policies. As we explain below, dividend 
policy makes an opportune setting in conducting our examination.  
In countries with weak legal institutions, dividends can be a strong signal of commitment for 
not expropriating minority shareholders, and thus a substitute for legal protection (see a 
discussion in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000)). According to this 
argument, retained earnings may be diverted by insiders for private benefits unless they are 
paid out to shareholders. Therefore, to have better access to public equity market for funds, 
                                                            
1 Many of these benefits have been well documented in the literature (see, for examples, Adhikari, Derashid, and 
Zhang, 2006; Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001; Berkman, Cole, and Fu, 2010; Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven, 2008; 
Faccio, 2006; Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell, 2006; and Khwaja and Mian, 2005). 
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firms, especially those with better growth opportunities, would pay dividends to build a 
reputation for moderation in expropriating shareholders. Gan, Lemmon, and Wang (2011) 
find the empirical support for this argument. This type of reputation-building are nonetheless 
not without cost when external funds are scarce and costly. However, a firm’s political 
connections may be a favourable substitute for dividends from the perspectives of both firms 
and investors for reasons as follows.  
On the one hand, connected firms are less likely to be financially constrained as they have 
better access to external funds, e.g., bank loans. Thus they may find themselves less 
compelled to pursue the costly reputation-building through paying dividend. On the other 
hand, connected firms are able to obtain business opportunities with high positive NPVs, 
which are unavailable to unconnected firms. Investors may prefer that firms retain earnings 
and invest in those projects, because returns from these investments are higher than returns if 
investors invest distributed earnings (through dividends) on their own. As such, investors in 
connected firms may not value dividends as highly as investors in unconnected firms, and 
they would have weaker incentives to demand dividends in exchange for their investment in 
the firms. Moreover, investors are more likely to endorse manager’s investment decisions. 
The above analysis yields the testable implication of political connections on firm dividend 
policy; namely, politically connected firms are less likely to pay dividends, and if they pay, 
they pay fewer. And more importantly, this dividend policy is aligned with minority 
shareholders’ interest.  
Using a sample of publicly-listed Chinese firms without government ownership (non-state-
owned-enterprises), we conduct an empirical analysis of this implication. Our finding 
confirms the negative effect of political connection on dividend payment. However, there is 
an alternative hypothesis that shares the same prediction of this relationship; connected firms 
may be less disciplined by capital markets and regulations (Berkman, Cole, and Fu, 2010), 
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and therefore controlling shareholders of connected firms are more likely to retain earnings to 
expropriate minority shareholders. To see how investors may distinguish the value of 
political connections from the expropriation risk, we conduct several additional tests. 
First, in examining the relation between connections and dividend policy, we control for a 
proxy for the expropriation risk, which is the wedge between control rights and cash flow 
rights of controlling shareholders. The existing literature suggests that minority shareholders 
in firms with a larger wedge are more likely to be expropriated by controlling shareholders 
(e.g., Claessens, Djankow and Lang, 2000 and 2002; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Lemmon and 
Lins, 2003; Lins, 2003; Maury and Pajuste, 2004; Xiao and Zhao, 2009; Faccio, Lang, and 
Young, 2010). We find that our main results are robust even after controlling for the 
expropriation risk. It suggests that the effect of political connections on firm dividend policy 
is above and beyond the expropriation consideration. 
Second, we investigate the abnormal stock returns around dividend announcement news. We 
find that, while investors react significantly positively to dividend initiation and increase 
announcements by unconnected firms, investors react even negatively in connected firms. 
This finding suggests that investors prefer connected firms to retain earnings instead of 
paying them out. The interpretation is that the expropriation risk potentially exists, but when 
investors weigh this risk against the valuable benefits of political connections, the benefits 
dominates the risk, and the announcement abnormal return captures the net effect of 
connections. 
Third, we show that connected firms with better growth opportunities invest significantly 
more than unconnected firms. Instead of tunnelling retained earnings away, connected firms 
tend to invest them. It is possible, because as we discuss earlier, connected firms can obtain 
more valuable business opportunities that are not available to unconnected firms. To address 
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the concern that connected firms may invest more in projects that can facilitate the tunnelling 
and expropriation in the future, we examine whether investors endorse the investment 
decisions or not. Specifically, we study how investors respond to connected firms’ acquisition 
decisions. We find that the abnormal announcement returns around acquisitions by connected 
firms are significantly higher than those by unconnected firms. This finding further mitigates 
the concern of the expropriation risk, and suggests that investors are more likely to endorse 
managerial decisions in connected firms. 
Lastly, we find that, despite not paying dividends (or paying fewer), connected firms are 
better able to tap the public capital market in issuing new equity than unconnected firms. This 
provides further support to our argument that political connections can substitute dividends as 
a reputation-building mechanism in accessing external funds. It cannot be explained by the 
expropriation incentive of connected firms in retaining earnings, because these firms may 
then find it difficult in raising additional capital in the public market.  
One might be concerned that a firm’s political connections is not exogenous. For instance, 
both a firm’s dividend policy and its choice for a politically connected management may be 
determined by firm unobservables. We address this omitted variable concern in two ways. 
First, we examine how a change in a firm’s connections status may lead to a change in its 
dividend policy. Second, we use instrument variables for a firm’s political connections and 
employ a two-step estimation approach to address how the relation between political 
connections and dividend policy may be affected after accounting for the endogeneity of 
political connections. We find that our main results are robust in both ways.  
Our study sheds light on the implication of political connections on the public equity market 
and corporate policies, which is less studied in the prior literature. Note that our findings 
should be more relevant in economies with weak legal institutions where the benefits of 
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political connections typically outweigh the costs for minority shareholders, and thus they 
should be interpreted appropriately. Overall, while we cannot completely rule out the 
expropriation risk that investors may fare in connected firms, we show a net effect of political 
connections on firms’ dividend policy. And we document empirically, for the first time in the 
literature, that investors have a high net valuation of firms’ political connections through their 
reactions to dividend announcements. Investors prefer connected firms to retain earnings for 
investment. And they are more likely to endorse managerial decisions in connected firms. 
Prior studies show that politically connected have easier access to bank loans (e.g., Khwaja 
and Mian, 2005; Faccio, 2006; Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell, 2006; Claessens, Feijen and 
Laeven, 2008). We complement them by showing that connected firms are also better able to 
access funds in the public equity market.  
Our study also contributes to the literature of corporate dividend policy.  We document some 
interesting findings that deviate from the conventional wisdom. Prior literature suggests that 
dividends signal a commitment for not expropriating minority shareholders, and therefore can 
be used to build up reputation in capital markets (e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
and Vishny, 2000; Faccio, Lang, and Young, 2001; Gan, Lemmon, and Wang, 2011). Our 
findings show that dividends are not always preferred when firms have political connections.  
Investors value the investments of retained earnings more by connected firms. We find that 
investors react even negatively to dividend initiation and increase in connected firms.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the sample selection, 
variable construction and summary statistics. Section 3 presents our main empirical results 





2. Data, variables, and summary statistics 
2.1 Data collection 
The data used in this paper mainly come from a collection of datasets from CSMAR database: 
the Chinese Listed Firm Cash Dividend Database (2002-2009); The Chinese Listed Firm 
Annual Report Database (2002-2009); The Chinese Listed Firm Corporate Governance 
Database (2002-2009); The Chinese Listed Firm Seasoned Equity Offerings Database (2002-
2009); The Chinese Listed Firm Merger and Acquisition Database (2002-2009); The Chinese 
Stock Market Index Return Database (2002-2009) and The Database of Chinese Listed Firms 
with Private Ultimate Owners (2002–2009). As indicated in earlier studies, CSMAR is the 
most important and most widely used database on the Chinese capital market.   
In this analysis, we focus on a sample of publicly listed firms with the ultimate controlling 
shareholders not being the government or the state.2 Meanwhile, we excluded (1) financial 
firms (firms with unique accounting standard and special financial characteristics), (2) ST 
(special treatment) firms or negative-equity firms (financial distressed firms), and (3) firms 
whose relevant data are not complete or cannot be acquired. The final sample consists of 410 
firms with 2,228 firm-year observations from 2002 to 2009. 
2.2 Variable construction 
2.2.1 Dividends 
Following La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000), and Faccio, Lang, and 
Young (2001), we use three measures of firms’ dividend payout, which are DTE (Total cash 
dividends to earnings), DTS (Total cash dividends to sales), and DTM (total cash dividends 
                                                            
2  Corporate policies may be biased by the government wills in SOEs (state-owned-enterprises). And by 
definition, there is no cross-sectional variation in political connection among SOEs. Therefore, we exclude them 
in our sample. 
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to the market capitalization of the firm). We also construct a dummy variable (CD_DUMMY) 
that equals to one if a firm pays cash dividend. As a unique feature of the Chinese stock 
market, Chinese listed firms often pay dividends in stock (in a form of bonus stocks). In this 
study, we focus on cash dividends, as stock dividends are not relevant in examining firms’ 
decisions of cash payout (stock dividends paying does not involve paying cash out of firms’ 
earnings). For completeness in examining dividend policy, we include stock dividends in 
some of our analysis. Thus, two additional dummy variables (SD_DUMMY and 
TD_DUMMY) are defined as follows. SD_DUMMY equals one if a firm pays share 
dividends, and TD_DUMMY equals one if a firm pays either cash dividends or share 
dividends (or both).  
2.2.2 Political connections 
Following Fan, Wang, and Zhang (2007) and Wu, Wu, and Rui (2010), we define a firm as 
being politically connected if either the Chairman or the general manager of the firm 
currently serves or formerly served in the government or military, or serves/served as a 
deputy of the National/Provincial People’s Congress or the People’s Political Consultative 
Conference.  
2.2.3 Control variables 
We follow the respective prior literatures in including the appropriate control variables when 
we analyse firms’ dividend policy, investment, seasoned equity offerings, and abnormal 
returns around acquisition announcements as discussed later. Detailed definitions of all 
variables used in the analysis are in the Appendix. 
2.3 Descriptive analysis 
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Table 1 presents results of descriptive analysis for our sample firms. Panel A summarizes the 
sample firms’ characteristics. In particular, the average ratios of cash dividends to 
earnings/sales/market capitalizations are 28.11, 2.55, and 0.86 percent, respectively. In about 
59 and 28 percent of the sample firm-years, firms pay out cash and share dividends 
respectively.  Also, we observe political connections (PC hereinafter) in approximately 40 
percent of our sample firm-years, indicating the widely existence of PC in Chinese privately 
owned firms.  
Panel B presents the univariate tests of comparing the dividend policy between firms with 
and without PC. It is clear that connected firms have significantly lower cash dividend ratios 
(in all three measures) and lower likelihood of cash dividend payment than firms without 
political connections (NPC hereinafter). And the differences between PC and NPC firms are 
highly significant. Not surprisingly, there is no significant difference in share dividends 
policy between PC firms and NPC firms. Further, PC firms observe significantly lower 
abnormal stock return than NPC firms when firms announce to initiate a dividend payment or 
increase dividends. We measure a three-day (-1, 1) abnormal stock returns by estimating the 
market model. The mean/median abnormal returns for NPC firms are 2.66/1.72 percent, and 
are statistically significant. Yet, they are negative for PC firms (-0.57/-0.08 percent) and the 
mean is marginally significant while the median is not. It suggests that, while shareholders in 
NPC firms generally applaud the dividend payout decisions, those in PC firms seem to be 
indifferent or even prefer firms retaining earnings instead of paying them out.   
In Panel C, we conduct a correlation analysis of all relevant variables. The correlation 
coefficients between most independent variables are not strong. We also checked the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) of the variables and find the VIF values of the variables are less than 10, 
indicating that multicollinearity is not a serious concern for our regressions. 
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3. Empirical analysis and interpretations of the results 
3.1 The effect of political connections on dividend policy 
We examine the impact of a firm’s political connections on its dividend policy using the 
following specification as the baseline model: 
i,t 1 i,t 2 i,tDividend policy =α+βPC +βX +Year and Industry dummies+ε
                     
 (1) 
where i and t represent firm and year, respectively. The dependent variables in Equation (1) 
can be continuous variables DTE, DTS and DTM, or dummy variables CD_DUMMY, 
SD_DUMMY and TD_DUMMY. When the dummy variables are used as dependent 
variables, we estimate a logistic model. X is a vector of control variables. In all regressions, 
we include year and industry dummies to control for time-specific and industry-specific 
effects unless otherwise specified.  
Table 2 presents the effect of PC on firms’ dividend ratios. Columns 1 to 3 of Panel A and 
Columns 1 to 3 of Panel B show the results of our baseline regressions with continuous and 
dummy variables of dividends, respectively. Consistent with the evidence of the univariate 
tests, PC firms are significantly less likely to pay cash dividends, and if they pay, they pay 
significantly less even after controlling for those well-documented determinants of dividend 
policy. The policy of paying share dividends is irrelevant to firms’ political connections as 
expected. In the following analysis, we mainly focus on cash dividends, and when we use the 
term “dividends”, we refer to cash dividends.  
 In addition, we find that larger and less leveraged firms pay more cash dividends, consistent 
with the findings in earlier studies (e.g., Farinha, 2003; Holder et al., 1998; John and 
Knyazeva, 2006; Renneboog and Trojanowski, 2007). Also, firms with better operating 
performance (ROA) are more likely to pay cash dividends, while higher-growth firms are less 
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likely to do so.  The interests of both managers and the largest shareholders have significant 
influence on a firm’s dividend policy. Firms pay more dividends when the largest 
shareholding and managerial ownership are higher. 
3.2 Additional analyses 
While we show that political connections has negative effect for a firm’s dividend payout, it 
remains unclear whether it is because investors value the firm’s connections and prefer the 
firm retaining earnings to invest more, or because of the expropriation incentive by the 
controlling shareholder. A PC firm is less likely to be subject to capital market discipline and 
government regulation compared with a NPC firm. Thus one may argue that the controlling 
shareholder of the PC firm may be less constrained in diverting funds away for her private 
benefit and thus has more incentive to expropriate the minority shareholders. As such, we 
would observe that a PC firm tends to retain earnings instead of paying them out. 
In the following analyses, we attempt to distinguish our main argument of valuable PC from 
this alternative expropriation interpretation. We start with conducting a robustness test of the 
PC-dividend relation by controlling for the controlling shareholder’s incentive to expropriate. 
Then we investigate whether investors endorse PC firms’ dividend policy, whether PC firms 
tunnel funds away or use them for more investments, and how investors may value 
managerial decisions in PC firms.       
3.2.1 Control for expropriation incentive 
If it is the expropriation incentive that drives the PC-dividend relation documented above, we 
would expect that this relation will not hold after we specifically control for the expropriation 
incentive. Following the prior literature (e.g., Classens et al., 2000, 2002; Faccio and Lang, 
2002; Faccio et al., 2010), we measure a controlling shareholder’s incentive to expropriate by 
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the wedge between the controlling shareholder’s control rights and cash flow rights. We 
include this variable into our baseline regressions, and examine the robustness of our earlier 
findings.  
In columns 4 to 6 of both Panel A and B in Table 2, we present our findings of this test. The 
estimated coefficients of PC remain almost intact after controlling for the wedge, both in 
economic magnitudes and statistical significance. It suggests that PC has significant 
incremental power in explaining a firm’s dividend policy to the controlling shareholder’s 
expropriation incentive. Meanwhile, while the coefficients of the wedge itself are negative for 
most of the cases indicating the potential of expropriation incentive, they are not statistically 
significant except in one measure. Note that the sample size reduces slightly in this 
robustness test, as the data on the wedge only became available since 2004.  
3.2.2 How do investors value the dividend payout? 
One intuitive way to examine whether a firm’s dividend policy benefits its minority 
shareholders is to see how they respond to the firm’s dividend announcement. Investors 
should value dividends higher if they are more concerned with the expropriation risk in PC 
firms. From Table 1 we find the opposite instead from the three-day abnormal returns around 
firms’ dividend initiation and increase announcements. The market responds significantly 
positively to announcements by NPC firms, but even negatively to those by PC firms. 
Investors value PC significantly more than their concerns over expropriation risk. Therefore, 
while it is hard to rule out the expropriation concern, the market response should capture 
investors’ net valuation of firm’s dividends.  
We conduct a multivariate regression of the abnormal stock returns around dividend 
announcements to examine the robustness of investors’ response. Results of Table 3 confirm 
that the abnormal announcement returns are significantly lower in PC firms.  The evidence is 
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consistent with investors’ preference for PC firms to retain earnings. PC firms can access 
more valuable business opportunities that are otherwise unavailable without the connections, 
and these business opportunities can generate higher returns than if investors make their own 
investments with the cash paid through dividends. Therefore, PC firms’ earnings retainment 
is consistent with investors’ welfare maximization if more investments can be made out of 
the retained earnings.  
3.2.3 Retaining earnings to tunnel or invest? 
One might be concerned that PC firms might retain earnings only to tunnel them away 
instead of making more investments as expected by investors. To address this concern, we 
have two tests. First, we investigate whether PC firms with better growth opportunities are 
more likely to retain earnings (and thus less likely to pay dividends or pay fewer). More 
investments through retained earnings are more likely. Furthermore, the value of PC should 
be more pronounced in these firms for investors, which suggests that fewer dividends are 
preferred. Second, we examine directly whether PC firms with better growth opportunities 
invest more.  
Table 4 presents the results of the effect of PC in higher-growth firms on its dividend policy. 
The baseline regressions are augmented with the addition of a growth variable and its 
interaction with PC. The growth variable is defined as the percentage of sales change from 
the last year. We find some evidence that PC firms with higher growth in sales pay even less 
dividends, as indicated by the negative coefficients of the PC-growth interaction term 
(statistically significant in two of our three measures of dividend ratios).   
In Table 5, we show that PC firms with better growth opportunities invest significantly more.  
The interaction term of PC and sales growth is significantly positive in explaining a firm’s 
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capital expenditure. Overall, PC firms, especially those with higher growth, retain earnings to 
invest rather than to tunnel them away.  
Yet, another concern arises that these firms might invest in such projects that benefit insiders 
more than minority shareholders. For instance, they may invest more in related transactions 
or make acquisitions with the controlling shareholders being the ultimate beneficiaries at the 
cost of minority shareholders’ interest. We address this issue in the next subsection. 
3.2.4 Do investors endorse managerial decisions in PC firms? 
PC firms with higher growth invest more. But do they invest in projects that benefit all 
shareholders and thus investors are more likely to endorse, or involve investments that 
facilitate insiders’ expropriation in the future? We study how investors may react towards 
managerial investment decisions. In general, if investors value PC over the expropriation risk, 
they should be more likely to endorse managerial decisions in PC firms. We circumvent the 
usual empirical challenge that most managerial decisions are either unobservable or non-
verifiable, and investigate merger and acquisition decisions made by PC and NPC firms. 
Table 6 conducts the regression regarding the effect of PC on the market reactions of M&A 
announcements, where the dependent variable is the three-day cumulative abnormal return. 
We find that PC firms earn significantly higher announcement returns, a magnitude of 0.75%, 
than NPC firms. Investors place a higher valuation of the acquisition decisions made by PC 
firms. It thus alleviates the concern that PC firms invest to expropriate in the future. 
3.2.5 Are PC firms better able to raise external equity funds? 
We have shown that investors value PC and have a preference for PC firms to retain earnings 
rather than paying out through dividends, suggesting PC can substitute dividends as a 
reputation-building mechanism in accessing external capital market. An implication of these 
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findings is that PC firms should find themselves in a more favourable position to issue new 
equity than NPC firms. Prior research shows that PC firms have easier access to private 
finance such as bank loans. Our study suggests that PC firms should also be better able to tap 
public equity. We empirically test this implication by showing whether PC firms have a 
higher likelihood of issuing seasoned equity and are able to issue more in the offerings.  
We conduct two regressions in which the dependent variables include whether a firm has a 
seasoned equity offering (SEO) in a year and the size of SEO. The SEO size is zero if a firm 
does not conduct a SEO. The results are reported in Table 7. PC firms are more likely to have 
SEOs. The magnitude of SEOs is significantly greater in PC firms, about 1.38 times of those 
conducted by NPC firms. This finding further supports the argument that investors have a 
higher net valuation of PC against the expropriation risk, which explains the better access of 
PC firms to the public equity market. 
In sum, while we do not rule out the expropriation risk faced by minority shareholders in PC 
firms, we show that shareholders value PC, prefer firms’ retaining earnings to paying 
dividends, and are more likely to endorse managerial decisions in PC firms. Instead of 
tunnelling retained earnings, PC firms with better growth opportunities tend to invest more in 
projects that investors endorse. 
3.3 Endogeneity issue 
A firm’s PC is not exogenous. Therefore, our finding that PC has a negative implication on 
dividend policy may be subject to an identification problem. For example, firm unobservables 
may have determined both the firm’s PC status and its dividend policy. We address this 
omitted variable concern with the following two attempts.  
3.3.1 Change in PC and change in dividend policy 
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First, we examine whether a firm’s dividend policy changes following a change in the firm’s 
PC status. The change in the firm’s PC status is triggered by its managerial turnover. And we 
focus on two scenarios: politically unconnected managers are replaced by connected 
managers (from NPC to PC), and connected managers are replaced by unconnected managers 
(from PC to NPC).3 In cases where both the old Chairman and the old CEO are politically 
connected in a firm, we need both of them replaced by unconnected ones for the firm to 
change its PC status from PC to NPC. But alternatively, for the change in PC status from 
NPC to PC, we need only one of the unconnected managers (the Chairman or the CEO) is 
replaced by a connected one. It is noteworthy that the change in PC status from PC to NPC 
should not be taken literally, because connected managers usually remain influential in firms 
informally even after their departure from their executive positions. Moreover, firms often 
make full use of their ex-managers’ political connections in obtaining business opportunities 
and dealing with government regulations. Therefore, we would expect a weaker effect of the 
change from PC to NPC on the firm’s dividend policy.  
The results are reported in Table 8. Both different dividend ratios and the probability of 
dividend payment drop sharply and statistically significantly when firms change from NPC to 
PC status. No significant changes are observed for firms which change from PC to NPC 
status. This is expected given the fact that firms remain implicitly connected at least for some 
time after their connected managers’ departure from their official positions. The number of 
observations in both scenarios is small. While managerial turnover in a typical Chinese firm 
takes place in three to four years, firms do not change their PC status mostly. Connected 
managers are more often replaced by new connected ones in connected firms, and firms who 
do not have connected managers remain unconnected over time. A full explanation of this 
phenomenon is out of the scope of this paper.     
                                                            
3 When a (un)connected manager is replaced a new (un)connected manager, the firm’s PC status remains 
unchanged (either connected or unconnected). These scenarios are therefore not examined.  
18 
 
3.3.2 Two-step estimation using IVs 
Second, we employ a two-step estimation to address the endogeneity of a firm’s PC status. In 
the first stage, we estimate the likelihood of a firm having its PC status using a logit 
regression model. We employ two instrument variables for PC. The first one is PRIVATIZE, 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if the privately owned firm transited from a former state-
owned enterprise (SOE) through privatization. Firms that are converted from former SOEs 
are more likely to be politically connected because they often inherited the political 
connection from the former SOEs by retaining the connected managers. Following Miller, 
Miller, Lester, and Cannella (2007) and Wu, Wu, and Rui (2010), we use our second IV 
which is the lagged values of the outcome variables, including lagged DTE, DTS, DTM and 
CD_DUMMY. In the second step of the estimation, we examine the effect of PC on dividend 
policy and include the predicted PC value obtained from the first step regression. 
Table 9 presents the two-step regression results. In the first step, we find that our instrumental 
variable PRIVATIZE has significantly positive effect on the likelihood of a firm being 
politically connected. In the second step, the coefficients of the predicted PC are statistically 
significant and have signs consistent with the findings in our baseline regressions. The 
magnitudes of these estimated coefficients are even greater after accounting for the 
endogeneity of PC. Overall, both the test on the change in PC status and the two-step 
estimation using instrument variables confirm the robustness of the finding that PC has a 
negative impact on a firm’s dividend payment. 
4. Conclusions  
In this study, we investigate the role of political connections on firm’s dividend policies and 
how minority shareholders value the firm’s political connections. We document that a firm’s 
political connections has negative impact on its dividend payment. Moreover, we provide 
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evidence that the dividend policy (not pay or pay less) in politically connected firms is 
aligned with minority shareholders’ interest and thus are endorsed by them.  
We also examine the extent of expropriation risk to minority shareholders in politically 
connected firms by looking at whether connected firms are more likely to tunnel retained 
earnings away for insiders’ private benefits. Our findings do not support the tunnelling 
conjecture. Instead, we find that connected firms with better growth opportunities channel 
more of their retained earnings into investments. And more importantly, investors endorse the 
investment activities. In return, connected firms are better able to raise new funds from the 
equity market than unconnected firms. 
Our empirical evidences have important implication on current literature regarding the value 
of political connection. Specifically, we identify that in transition economies such as China 
where the legal system is still weak, political connections usually has much more value than 
in developed economies. Our findings imply that the value of political connections outweighs 
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Appendix: Definition of variables 
 




DTE Total cash dividend to earnings 
DTS Total cash dividend to sales 
DTM Total cash dividend to market value 
CD_DUMMY Dummy variable that equals to 1 if a firm pays cash dividend 
SD_DUMMY Dummy variable that equals to 1 if a firm pays share dividend 
TD_DUMMY Dummy variable that equals to 1 if a firm pays either cash or share dividend 
Market reaction 
CAR(-1, +1) 
Cumulative abnormal return from day -1 to day +1 around the event 
announcement day 
Other dependent variables 
CAPEXTA Total capital expenditure to total assets 
SEO_DUMMY dummy variable that equals to 1 if the firm has a SEO in a specific year 




A dummy variable that equals to 1 if the CEO or chairman of the board is 
currently or was formerly an officer of the government or military or a deputy 
of the National/Provincial People’s Congress or People’s Political Consultative 
Conference 
Firm's specific control variables 
Firm growth (Tobin' Q) Market value/replacement value 
LNSIZE Natural logthrim of total assets 
LEV Total debt to total assets 
RETAINE Total retained earning to equity 
ROA Net profit to total assets 
NOCF Net operational cash flow to sales 
Q Market value/replacement value 
LARGEST Proportion of shares held by largest shareholders 
MANAGER The propertion of shares held by managers 








Table 1. Descriptive analysis 
Panel A. Summary statistics 
This panel presents the mean, Median, Maximum, Minimum, and standard deviation (STD) for all 
variables used in the paper. Definitions of all the variables are reported in Appendix. 
  MEAN MEDIAN MAX MIN STDEV
Dependent variables 
DTE (%) 28.11 14.43 1155.49 0.00  55.66 
DTS (%) 2.55 0.86 171.82 0.00  5.86 
DTM (%) 0.86 0.37 26.37 0.00  1.46 
CD_DUMMY 0.59 1.00 1.00 0.00  0.49 
SD_DUMMY 0.28 0.00 1.00 0.00  0.45 
TD_DUMMY 0.64 1.00 1.00 0.00  0.48 
Independent and control variables 
PC 0.40 0.00 1.00 0.00  0.49 
SIZE (RMB Milllion) 2196 1290 41934 146  2962 
LEV 0.46 0.47 0.99 0.02  0.18 
RETAINE 0.05 0.17 41.37 -99.95  3.01 
ROA 0.04 0.03 0.44 -0.64  0.06 
MANAGER 0.10 0.00 0.95 0.00  0.19 
NOCF -0.05 0.08 41.51 -305.58  6.53 
LARGEST 0.34 0.30 0.86 0.03  0.14 
 
Panel B. Univariate test for politically connected and non-connected firms 
This panel presents the univariate test for main dependent variables used in this paper. PC firms refer 
to firms with political connections and NPC firms represents firms without political connections. 
CAR (-1, +1) is the three-day cumulative abnormal stock returns around the announcement of cash 
dividend initial or increase. T-test column indicate the t value of differences in means and W-test 
column presents the z value of the Wilcoxon test of difference in medians. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  NPC firms PC firms Difference Tests 
Dependent variables 
Mean Median Mean Median
T-test W-test
DTE (%) 33.42  22.37 20.12 0.00 5.59***  8.71*** 
DTS (%) 2.94  1.30 1.96 0.00 3.90***  7.51*** 
DTM (%) 0.96  0.53 0.73 0.00 3.63***  6.87*** 
CD_DUMMY 0.66  1.00 0.49 0.00 8.24***  8.12***
SD_DUMMY 0.29  0.00 0.26 0.00 1.49  1.49
TD_DUMMY 0.71  1.00 0.55 1.00 7.69***   7.59***





Panel C. Pearson correlation matrix of all variables 
This Table reports the correlation matrix of dependent and independent variables. P-values are displayed in italics. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Definitions of variables are detailed in Appendix. 
Var DTE DTS DTM CD_DUMMY SD_DUMMY TD_DUMMY PC LNSIZE LEV RETAINE ROA NOCF LARGEST MANAGER 
DTE 1.00 
DTS 0.54*** 1.00  
0.00 
DTM 0.61*** 0.61***  1.00 
0.00 0.00  
CD_DUMMY 0.42*** 0.36***  0.50*** 1.00 
0.00 0.00  0.00 
SD_DUMMY 0.01 0.10***  0.03 0.28*** 1.00 
0.67 0.00  0.11 0.00 
TD_DUMMY 0.38*** 0.32***  0.45*** 0.90*** 0.46*** 1.00 
0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 
PC -0.12*** -0.08***  -0.08*** -0.17*** -0.03 -0.16*** 1.00  
0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 
LNSIZE 0.03 0.05**  0.13*** 0.13*** 0.05** 0.14*** 0.14****  1.00 
0.19 0.02  0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00  
LEV -0.13*** -0.29***  -0.12*** -0.21*** -0.11*** -0.21*** 0.13***  0.38*** 1.00 
0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
RETAINE 0.02 0.02  0.03 0.07*** 0.04* 0.07*** -0.02  0.07*** -0.13*** 1.00 
0.26 0.24  0.15 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.34  0.00 0.00 
ROA 0.07*** 0.23***  0.17*** 0.34*** 0.23*** 0.35*** -0.08***  0.13*** -0.28*** 0.05** 1.00 
0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.02 
NOCF 0.01 0.01  0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.02  -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 1.00 
0.59 0.54  0.52 0.22 0.55 0.18 0.33  0.82 0.39 0.96 0.25 
LARGEST 0.07*** 0.09***  0.12*** 0.16*** 0.03 0.16*** 0.03  0.10*** -0.01 0.02 0.06*** 0.01 1.00 
0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.20  0.00 0.55 0.47 0.00 0.58 
MANAGER 0.05*** 0.10***  0.04** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.19*** -0.13***  -0.21*** -0.17*** 0.04* 0.09*** 0.01 -0.07*** 1.00  
  0.01 0.00  0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.65 0.00   
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Table 2. The effect of political connections on dividend policy 
This Table presents the regression results on the effect of political connections on firms’ dividend 
policy. Panel A reports the effect of political connections on dividend ratios, where the dependent 
variables are percentage of cash dividend ratios. Panel B reports the effect of political connections on 
probability of dividend payment, where the dependent variables are dividend dummy variables. 
Definitions of all independent variables are reported in Appendix. The number of observations is 
smaller when we control for control-ownership wedge in Columns 4 to 6 because firms begun to 
disclose control-ownership wedge information since 2004. P-values are displayed in italics. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. The effect of political connections on cash dividend ratios 
Var DTE% DTS% DTM% DTE% DTS% DTM% 
_CONS -163.07***  -12.32** -6.83*** -150.81*** -10.42*  -6.08*** 
0.00  0.05 0.00 0.01 0.10  0.00 
PC -12.26***  -0.46* -0.22*** -12.92*** -0.50*  -0.26*** 
0.00  0.08 0.01 0.00 0.07  0.01 
LNSIZE 8.85***  0.69*** 0.37*** 8.53*** 0.60**  0.35*** 
0.00  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02  0.00 
LEV -38.59***  -7.27*** -1.13*** -33.27*** -6.93***  -1.05*** 
0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
RETAINE 0.08  -0.03** -0.01 0.34 -0.03**  -0.003 
0.57  0.02 0.20 0.15 0.05  0.36 
ROA -40.75  8.03* 2.55*** -45.73 7.52*  2.44** 
0.31  0.06 0.01 0.28 0.09  0.02 
NOCF -0.03  0.01 0.01 0.30 0.21*  0.01 
0.23  0.15 0.14 0.64 0.07  0.76 
Q 8.12  1.32 0.11 8.52 1.34  0.12 
0.17  0.11 0.37 0.16 0.12  0.34 
LARGEST 29.24**  4.33*** 0.92** 36.44** 4.68**  1.08*** 
0.02  0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02  0.01 
MANAGER 15.45**  2.47*** 0.49*** 8.69 2.32**  0.35 
0.02  0.00 0.01 0.27 0.02  0.11 
WEDGE -32.05* -0.26  -0.53 
0.06 0.87  0.30 
Industry Yes 
Year Yes 
obs. 2228  2228 2228 1933 1933  1933 







Panel B. The effect of political connections on probability of dividend payment 
Var CD_DUMMY SD_DUMMY TD_DUMMY CD_DUMMY SD_DUMMY TD_DUMMY 
_CONS -8.77***  -4.20** -9.10*** -8.38*** -3.14*  -8.12*** 
0.00  0.02 0.00 0.00 0.10  0.00 
PC -0.72***  0.05 -0.65*** -0.71*** 0.09  -0.62*** 
0.00  0.71 0.00 0.00 0.50  0.00 
LNSIZE 0.44***  0.15* 0.48*** 0.40*** 0.07  0.42*** 
0.00  0.07 0.00 0.00 0.44  0.00 
LEV -2.40***  -0.58 -2.47*** -2.28*** -0.46  -2.32*** 
0.00  0.20 0.00 0.00 0.35  0.00 
RETAINE 4.27***  2.47*** 4.01*** 4.44*** 2.51***  4.14*** 
0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
ROA 13.35***  6.15*** 15.73*** 12.77*** 5.79***  15.17*** 
0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
NOCF 0.01  0.01*** 0.02 0.16* 0.04  0.18** 
0.13  0.01 0.19 0.08 0.54  0.04 
Q -0.22***  0.07 -0.31*** -0.21*** 0.07  -0.30*** 
0.01  0.24 0.00 0.01 0.22  0.00 
LARGEST 1.76***  0.52 1.81*** 1.88*** 0.79*  2.01*** 
0.00  0.22 0.00 0.00 0.10  0.00 
MANAGER 1.27***  1.50*** 1.65*** 1.17** 1.31***  1.45*** 
0.01  0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00  0.01 
WEDGE 0.24 -0.37  -0.26 
0.79 0.62  0.77 
Industry Yes 
Year Yes 
obs. 2228  2228 2228 1933 1933  1933 













Table 3. The effect of political connections on market reaction of the dividend initiation 
and increase announcement 
This Table presents the regression results on the effect of political connections on market reaction 
around the announcement of dividend initiation and increase. The dependent variable is the three days 
cumulative abnormal return (-1, 1) around the dividend announcement. NAPS is net asset per share, 
ROE is return on equity, while growth is percentage of sales change. Definitions of all independent 
variables are reported in Appendix. P-values are displayed in italics. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
































Table 4. The effect of political connections on dividend policy of firms with high growth 
This Table presents the regression results on the effect of political connections and growth on cash 
dividend policy. The dependent variables are cash dividend ratios and probability of dividend 
payment. Growth is percentage of sales change. Definitions of all independent variables are reported 
in Appendix. P-values are displayed in italics. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively.  
Var DTE% DTS% DTM% CD_DUMMY
 
_CONS -102.79*** -0.06 -5.79*** -11.18*** 
0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 
PC -11.87*** -0.40 -0.21** -0.69*** 
0.00 0.11 0.02 0.00 
GROWTH 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.01 
0.64 0.87 0.41 0.61 
PC*GROWTH -0.31 -0.07** -0.03* -0.07 
0.43 0.05 0.06 0.45 
LNSIZE 6.41*** 0.26 0.34*** 0.47*** 
0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 
LEV -41.71*** -7.72*** -1.19*** -2.26*** 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
REATINE -0.01 -0.04*** 0.00 4.24*** 
0.88 0.01 0.12 0.00 
ROA -3.21 14.09*** 3.07*** 11.97*** 
0.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NOCF -0.01 0.01** 0.00* 0.01* 
0.50 0.04 0.07 0.08 
LARGEST 22.28** 3.35*** 0.81*** 2.03*** 
0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 
MANAGER 10.24 1.71** 0.41** 1.38*** 
0.11 0.02 0.02 0.00 
Industry Yes 
Year Yes 
Obs. 2252 2252 2252 2252 










Table 5. The effect of political connections and growth on capital expenditure 
This Table presents the regression results on the effect of political connections and growth on capital 
expenditure. Dependent variables are measures of firms’ capital expenditure. Growth is percentage of 
sales change. Definitions of all independent variables are reported in Appendix. P-values are 




































Table 6. The effect of political connections on market reaction around the M&A 
announcement 
This Table presents the regression results on the effect of political connections on market reaction 
around the announcement of M&A. The dependent variable is the three days (-1, 1) cumulative 
abnormal return around the dividend announcement. M&A SIZE is defined as total value of the M&A 
to total assets of the merger firm. M&A LOCTION is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the 
acquiring firm and the targe firm is in the same locations (governed by the same local government). 
M&A RPT is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the M&A activity is a related party transaction. 
Definitions of all independent variables are reported in Appendix. P-values are displayed in italics. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  





M&A SIZE 2.85 
0.14 
M&A LOCATION 0.95*** 
0.01 



























Table 7. The effect of political connections on seasoned equity offering 
This Table presents the regression results on the effect of political connections on seasoned equity 
offerings. Dependent variables are both probability of SEO and SEO size. Definitions of all 
independent variables are reported in Appendix. P-values are displayed in italics. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
SEO_DUMMY LNSEO
_CONS -16.13*** -20.42*** 
0.00 0.00 
PC 1.05*** 1.38*** 
0.00 0.00 
Q -0.04 -0.00 
0.73 0.98 
LNSIZE 0.66*** 1.02*** 
0.00 0.00 
LEV -1.82*** -2.31*** 
0.01 0.00 
RETAINE 0.01 -0.02** 
0.77 0.05 
ROA 3.24 3.76 
0.21 0.20 
NOCF 0.00 0.00 
0.40 0.16 
MANAGER -0.02 -0.15 
0.97 0.79 




obs. 2229 2229 
Pseudo R-square 0.16 











Table 8. Changes in dividend policy and changes in political connection status 
This Table presents the results on how firms’ dividend policy change when the political connections 
status changes. PC refers to firms with political connections and NPC represents firms without 
political connections. Change from NPC to PC refers to a firm’s unconnected CEO/Chairman being 
replaced by a connected CEO/Chairman. Change from PC to NPC refers to a firm’s connected 
CEO/Chairman being replaced by an unconnected CEO/Chairman. T-test column indicate the t value 
of differences and W-test column presents the z value of the Wilcoxon test of difference. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Mean Median Mean Median Difference tests 
Change from NPC to PC 
Before After T-test W-test
Obs. 53 50 
DTE (%) 29.66  0.00 7.29 0.00 3.25***  2.97*** 
DTS (%) 1.93  0.00 1.04 0.00 1.67*  2.51** 
DTM (%) 1.09  0.00 0.21 0.00 3.22***  3.04*** 
CD_DUMMY (%) 48.08  0.00 24.00 0.00 2.59***  2.52** 
Change from PC to NPC 
Before After 
Obs. 39  39  
DTE (%) 17.04  0.00 31.48 0.00 -0.83  -0.25 
DTS (%) 1.57  0.00 1.75 0.00 -0.28  -0.24 
DTM (%) 0.81  0.00 0.49 0.00 1.51  0.43 














Table 9. Two-step tests using IVs to address the endogeneity of political connection 
This Table presents the two-step regression results on the effect of political connections on dividend 
policy. PRIVATIZE is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm transited from a former state-owned 
enterprise (SOE) through privatization. LAGDTE, LAGDTS, LAGDTM and LAGCD_DUMMY are 
lagged value of DTE, DTS, DTM and CD_DUMMY, respectively. PC^ is the estimation value of PC 
from the first stage regression. Columns 1, 3, 5, 7 present the results of the first stage regression, 
where the dependent variable is PC dummy, and the instrumental variables are PRIVALIZE, 
LAGDTE, LAGDTS, LAGDTM and LAGCD_DUMMY, respectively. Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 present 
the second stage regression results using DTE, DTS, DTM and CD_DUMMY as dependent variable 
and the estimated PC value from the first stage as the main explanatory variable. The definitions of 
other variables are reported in Appendix. P-values are displayed in italics. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Var PC DTE PC DTS PC DTM PC CD_DUMMY 
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2 
_CONS -7.80***  -188.69***  -7.48*** -9.11** -8.09*** -9.31*** -8.66***  -19.17*** 
0.01  0.00  0.01 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00  0.00 
PRIVATIZE 0.51*  0.61** 0.56** 0.49*  
0.06  0.02 0.04 0.07  






LAGCD_DUMMY -0.68***  
0.00  








LNSIZE 0.34***  13.23***  0.31*** 0.85*** 0.35*** 0.61*** 0.38***  1.04*** 
0.01  0.00  0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01  0.00 
LEV 0.13  -19.78**  0.27 -4.47*** 0.26 -0.23 0.19  -0.11 
0.85  0.02  0.70 0.00 0.71 0.46 0.79  0.84 
RETAINE 0.04  0.61***  0.04 -0.02 0.04 0.01*** 0.05  2.78*** 
0.40  0.00  0.42 0.21 0.40 0.00 0.47  0.00 
ROA -1.83  -43.60  -2.19* 13.85*** -1.98 1.67* -1.18  19.81*** 
0.16  0.12  0.10 0.00 0.13 0.09 0.35  0.00 
NOCF -0.01**  -0.22***  -0.01** -0.01* 0.01** 0.01*** 0.01**  0.16 
35 
 
0.02  0.00  0.02 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.03  0.19 
Q 0.05  1.85**  0.07 0.14 0.06 0.06* 0.06  0.22*** 
0.60  0.03  0.40 0.37 0.52 0.07 0.52  0.01 
LARGEST 0.75  21.23**  0.63 3.07** 0.56 0.82** 0.72  1.82*** 
0.34  0.05  0.43 0.02 0.48 0.02 0.37  0.00 
MANAGER -0.40  20.69**  -0.37 1.54 0.59 1.20*** 0.27  2.02*** 
0.54  0.03  0.57 0.14 0.37 0.00 0.68  0.00 
Industry Yes 
Year Yes 
obs. 1844  1844  1844 1844 1844 1844 1844  1844 
R-square 0.07  0.09 0.06 0.13 0.06 0.20 0.07  0.35 
 
 
